"Kant's Second Thoughts on Race." by Kleingeld, P
Volume 57 • Number 229 • October 2007
The Scots Philosophical Club and the University of St Andrews
CONTENTS
ARTICLES                                                                                                                  
The Regress of Pure Powers? Alexander Bird 513
The Expressive Role of Truth in 
Truth-Conditional Semantics Claire Horisk 535
The Responsibility of Soldiers and the Ethics 
of Killing in War Yitzhak Benbaji 558
Kant’s Second Thoughts on Race Pauline Kleingeld 573
How is Descartes’ Argument against Scepticism 
Better than Putnam’s? Michael Jacovides 593
Reid on Consciousness: HOP, HOT or FOR? Rebecca Copenhaver 613
Why Williamson Should Be a Sceptic Dylan Dodd 635
The Anti-Zombie Argument Keith Frankish 650
DISCUSSIONS                                                                                                            
A Consistent Reading of Sylvan’s Box Daniel Nolan 667
Depicting Colours: Reply to Newall John Hyman 674
CRITICAL STUDY                                                                                                       
Mulgan’s Future People Rahul Kumar 679
BOOK REVIEWS                                                                                                  686
KANT’S SECOND THOUGHTS ON RACE
B P K
During the s, as Kant was developing his universalistic moral theory, he published texts in
which he defended the superiority of whites over non-whites. Whether commentators see this as
evidence of inconsistent universalism or of consistent inegalitarianism, they generally assume that
Kant’s position on race remained stable during the s and s. Against this standard view, I
argue on the basis of his texts that Kant radically changed his mind. I examine his s race theory
and his hierarchical conception of the races, and subsequently address the question of the significance
of these views, especially in the light of Kant’s own ethical theory. I then show that during the s
Kant restricts the role of the concept of race, and drops his hierarchical account of the races in favour
of a more genuinely egalitarian and cosmopolitan view.
Most of the old divisions of the human species have long been rejected anyhow.
Noah’s sons, the four parts of the world, the four colours, white, black, yellow,
copper red – who still thinks of these outdated fashions today?
Georg Forster, Guiding-Thread to a Future History of Humankind ()1
I. INTRODUCTION
In , the year in which he published the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant
also published an essay in which he claimed that people from Africa and
India lack a ‘drive to activity’, and hence lack the mental capacities to be
self-motivated and successful in northern climates, never becoming any-
thing more than drifters.2 He writes that Nature, whose wisdom he praises,
discourages the migration of races across the globe by making them ill
1 Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR, later Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie der
Wissenschaften (ed.), Georg Forsters Werke (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, –), Vol. , p. .
2 References to Kant are to Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Royal Prussian (later German)
Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Reimer, subsequently Walter de Gruyter, –). Abbreviations:
A = Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View; DCHR = ‘Determination of the Concept of a
Human Race’; DHR = ‘Of the Diﬀerent Human Races’; G = Groundwork for the Metaphysics of
Morals; HR = Review of Herder’s Ideen; IUH = ‘Idea for a Universal History’; MM =
Metaphysics of Morals; PP = Toward Perpetual Peace ; TPP = ‘On the Use of Teleological Principles
in Philosophy’.
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equipped to change from one climate zone to another, ill equipped
‘especially [for] the exchange of a warm climate for a cold one’ (TPP : ).
He adds a footnote here in which he endorses a pro-slavery text, citing with
approval a critique of a proposal to free black slaves, with the argument that
they will never be good labourers unless they are coerced into activity (TPP
: n.). They can work, but they cannot make themselves work. Native
Americans, he goes on, are a race (or rather, a semi-race) stunted in its
development because their ancestors migrated to a diﬀerent climate before
they had fully adapted to their earlier environment. As a result, they are
weak, inert, ‘incapable of any culture’; and they occupy the lowest level of
the racial hierarchy that Kant claims to have determined:
That their temperament has not become entirely adequate to any climate can also be
inferred from the fact that it is hard to find any other reason why this race, which
is too weak for hard labour and too indiﬀerent for industrious work, and which is
incapable of any culture3 even though there are enough examples and encouragement
in the vicinity [namely, the example set by the European colonial settlers], stands far
below even the Negro, who occupies the lowest of all other levels which we have men-
tioned as racial diﬀerences (TPP : ).
Kant’s unstated assumption, made explicit elsewhere, is that ‘whites’ occupy
the top level of this hierarchy.4
These statements, in the essay ‘On the Use of Teleological Principles in
Philosophy’, are appalling at many levels. The racial hierarchy, defended
with a biased reading of travel reports and a teleological race theory, goes
against the presumption of human equality which one would expect from
someone with a universalist moral theory. After all, the basic moral principle
which Kant formulates during the s, the Categorical Imperative in its
several versions, is, at least in its wording, addressed to all humans (or, even
more broadly, to all finite rational beings). Although Kant’s own definition
of race as such is formulated merely in terms of heritable diﬀerences in
physical appearance, he nevertheless connects his understanding of race
with a hierarchical account according to which the races also vary greatly in
their capacities for agency and their powers of intellect. This was despite
the fact that there were well known and esteemed authors who provided
much evidence to the contrary in works that Kant himself had reviewed or
commented on. Moreover, Kant’s race theory and its implications for
global migration cast his cosmopolitanism in a disconcerting light – at least
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3 The term ‘culture’ here could refer to agriculture or to development generally.
4 Lectures on Anthropology (–), .: . Cf. also ‘Humanity is at its greatest perfection
in the race of the whites’, Lectures on Physical Geography, : . It should be noted that although
the Lectures on Physical Geography were published in , the book cannot be regarded as
reflecting the views Kant held during the late s. There are problems with the edition that
make it diﬃcult to date specific passages (quite a few go back to the pre-Critical period).
his cosmopolitanism of the s. As I shall show below, however, Kant
changed and improved his position during the s.
The claim that Kant had second thoughts on race in the middle of the
‘Critical’ period goes against the existing views on the matter in the Kant
literature. Whether they emphasize his racism or his universalism, commen-
tators generally suppose that Kant’s position remained stable during the
Critical period. Authors such as Bernasconi, Eze and Mills highlight Kant’s
white supremacist comments, and argue that his moral theory is less than
universalist.5 Authors such as Louden, McCarthy and Hill and Boxill devote
much attention to Kant’s racist remarks, but argue, in diﬀerent ways, that
Kant’s main theory as defended during the s and s is truly uni-
versalist, even though Kant fundamentally contradicts this theory with his
racial hierarchy.6 Sankar Muthu acknowledges Kant’s racial hierarchism,
but claims that he abandoned it at the beginning of the Critical period.7 In
contrast with all these interpretations, I shall argue that Kant did defend a
racial hierarchy until at least the end of the s, but that he changed
his mind, after the publication of ‘On the Use of Teleological Principles in
Philosophy’ (and most likely after ), and before the completion of Toward
Perpetual Peace ().
In the first section, I present Kant’s s theory of race. The fact that
Kant simultaneously defended a universalist moral theory and a racial hier-
archy during the s raises important questions for interpreters, however.
Should one choose to disregard Kant’s racism and focus on the Groundwork
and the Critique of Practical Reason while abstracting from his racist attitudes?
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5 R. Bernasconi, ‘Who Invented the Concept of Race? Kant’s Role in the Enlightenment
Construction of Race’, in R. Bernasconi (ed.), Race (Oxford: Blackwell, ), pp. –, and
‘Kant as an Unfamiliar Source of Racism’, in T. Lott and J. Ward (eds), Philosophers on Race
(Oxford UP, ), pp. –; E.C. Eze, Achieving Our Humanity: the Idea of the Postracial Future
(New York: Routledge, ), and ‘The Colour of Reason: the Idea of “Race” in Kant’s
Anthropology’, in K.M. Faull (ed.), Anthropology and the German Enlightenment (Bucknell UP,
), pp. –; C.W. Mills, ‘Kant’s Untermenschen’, in A. Valls (ed.), Race and Racism in Modern
Philosophy (Cornell UP, ), pp. –; M. Larrimore, ‘Sublime Waste: Kant on the
Destiny of the “Races”’, in C. Wilson (ed.), Civilization and Oppression (Calgary UP, ),
pp. –. Cf. also T. Serequeberhan, ‘Eurocentrism in Philosophy: the Case of Immanuel
Kant’, Philosophical Forum,  (), pp. –.
6 T.E. Hill Jr and B. Boxill, ‘Kant and Race’, in B. Boxill (ed.), Race and Racism (Oxford
UP, ), pp. –; R.B. Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics (Oxford UP, ); T. McCarthy,
‘On the Way to a World Republic? Kant on Race and Development’, in L. Waas (ed.), Politik,
Moral und Religion – Gegensätze und Ergänzungen: Festschrift zum . Geburtstag von Karl Graf Ballestrem
(Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, ), pp. –. Cf. also B. Dörflinger, ‘Die Einheit der
Menschheit als Tiergattung: zum Rassebegriﬀ in Kants physischer Anthropologie’, in
V. Gerhardt et al. (eds), Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung. Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses,
 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, ), Vol. , pp. –.
7 S. Muthu, Enlightenment against Empire (Princeton UP, ), pp. –. Muthu claims that
TPP contains ‘no arguments about the pre-eminence of whites or Europeans over other
human races’ (p. ).
Or do the latter imply that Kant’s moral universalism should be read quite
diﬀerently? Was Kant an inconsistent universalist, or, as has been argued
recently, a consistent inegalitarian? After an exposition of Kant’s s
theory of race, I address these questions. I then move to a discussion of the
views Kant developed during the s, showing how they diﬀer from his
earlier commitments.
II. KANT’S s THEORY OF RACE AND ITS CRITICS
When he started his theoretical work on the concept of race, Kant had
already expressed on several occasions his views on the inferiority of non-
whites. One of the most notorious examples is his remark, in Observations on
the Beautiful and the Sublime (), that the fact that a negro carpenter was
black from head to toe clearly proved that what he said was stupid (: ).
He cites Hume’s comment that no Negro has ever shown any talent, con-
cluding (: ) that the diﬀerences between blacks and whites are ‘essential’
and seem to be ‘as large with regard to mental powers as they are in colour’.
Kant’s first essay dedicated to a theoretical examination of questions of
race was originally published in  in the form of a course announcement,
then amplified in  and entitled ‘Of the Diﬀerent Human Races’. In this
essay, Kant connects race with common ancestry and certain bodily proper-
ties. He defines racial features as heritable traits that are perpetuated
through generations regardless of geographical location, and are necessarily
passed on to oﬀspring, so that procreation with a human of a diﬀerent race
leads to a blending of characteristics. Kant’s focus was on features such as
skin colour, facial traits and hair structure. But he also added comments,
such as that blacks are lazy and that Native Americans have a ‘half-
extinguished vital energy’ (DHR : ), and remarked on their respective
usefulness as slaves.8
Statements of a similar nature are found in Kant’s lectures on anthropo-
logy and on physical geography. In anthropology lectures from (probably)
–, he asserts that Native Americans are the lowest of the four races, as
they are completely inert, impassive, and incapable of being educated at all.
He places the ‘Negroes’ above them, as they are capable of being trained9 to
be slaves (but are incapable of any other form of education) (.: ).
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8 ‘To mention just one example, in Surinam one uses red slaves (Americans) only for
domestic work, because they are too weak for work in the field. For field work one needs
negroes’ (DHR : , note). Surinam was a Dutch colony, and the term ‘one’ [man] refers to
the slave owners. It is hard to avoid the impression here that Kant implicitly accepts slavery, at
least for non-whites.
9 ‘Abrichten’, a term used for the training of animals.
Kant’s acceptance of non-white slavery is also apparent in passages such as
the following: ‘Americans and Negroes cannot govern themselves. Thus,
[they] serve only as slaves’ (sketches for the Lectures on Anthropology, from
the s, : ). The ‘Hindus’ are superior to the Negroes, because they
can be educated, but they can be educated only in the arts, not in the
sciences and other endeavours that require abstract concepts. The ‘white’
race is superior and is the only non-deficient race: ‘the race of whites con-
tains all incentives and talents’ (ibid.).10 Perhaps such views also explain why
in his  essay ‘Idea for a Universal History’, defending the belief that
history is progressing towards a ‘cosmopolitan constitution’, Kant casually
and ambiguously comments that Europe ‘will probably eventually legislate
for all other continents’ (IUH : ).
In the second part of his Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Humankind,
Johann Gottfried Herder rejected Kant’s concept of race, on the grounds
that both the criterion of common ancestry and that of skin colour fail to
lead to a clear-cut division between four or five races: either one takes a very
wide perspective, and then all humans share the same ancestors, or else one
interprets the criterion of common ancestry more narrowly, and then
one ends up with an infinitely large number of races, many of which would
have the same colour.11 Herder also oﬀered much evidence intended to dis-
prove race-related hierarchies, e.g., emphasizing the culture, strength and
liveliness of Native Americans.12
Kant, in his  review of Herder’s work, mentions their disagreement.
Regarding Herder’s rejection of the concept of race, Kant remarks that this
must mean that the concept of race was not yet ‘determined’ precisely
enough for Herder (HR : ). Kant wrote the review and his essay ‘De-
termination of the Concept of a Human Race’ around the same time, and
both texts were published in November of  (the same year as Groundwork
for the Metaphysics of Morals). Thus it is not implausible to assume that this
essay was at least in part a reaction to Herder.13
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10 In the Lectures on Physical Geography Dohna (Summer semester ), Kant still
endorses Hume’s claim that blacks are naturally inferior (Physical Geography Dohna, p. ).
I would like to thank Werner Stark for providing me with the relevant passages of the Dohna
MS as well as several of Kant’s earlier lectures on the topic.
11 Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, ed. B. Suphan, Herders Sämmtliche Werke
(Berlin: Weidmann, ), Vol. , pp. –.
12 Op. cit., pp. –. Herder’s opposition to Kant’s race theory should not let us forget that
Herder was opposed to mixing ‘nations’ or (curiously) ‘human species’ (Menschen-Gattungen,
: ). Herder was opposed to this not on the basis of a hierarchy among them, but on the
assumption that they each have a diﬀerent ‘character’, and that mixing these inevitably pro-
duces a non-viable monstrosity.
13 The disagreement with Herder was certainly not the only occasion for Kant’s essay,
though. In , Kant mentioned that he had a text in preparation on the topic of race, in
In ‘Determination of the Concept of a Human Race’, Kant lays out a
race theory which deals strictly with physical diﬀerences among humans and
does not mention any race-related diﬀerences in moral or cognitive cap-
acities. Although the paper is clearly written from a ‘white’ perspective and
for a ‘white’ audience (as indicated by Kant’s use of the words ‘we’ and ‘us’,
and features such as his readiness to assume that blacks necessarily smell
bad), there is no indication of a racial hierarchy with regard to moral stand-
ing or intellectual, moral and psychological abilities. In fact, Kant states
early on that all humans share the essential human predispositions, and that
these are therefore irrelevant for the discussion of race:
Properties that belong to the species itself in its essence, and which are hence common
to all human beings as such, are inevitably hereditary; but because human beings do
not diﬀer with regard to these properties, these will be kept out of the discussion of the
subdivision of the races (DCHR : ).
Thus one might think that by  Kant had dropped his earlier view that
racial diﬀerences included not only physical but also intellectual, moral and
psychological diﬀerences.
His leading questions in the essay regard the theory of heredity. They are
pre-Mendelian eighteenth-century puzzles like this one: why is it that when
a blue-eyed and a brown-eyed white human procreate, the child’s eyes are
either blue or brown, whereas when a black-skinned and a white-skinned
human procreate, the colour of the baby’s skin is something in between?
Kant’s proposal is that the first case concerns varieties within one race, and in
such cases the oﬀspring does not necessarily inherit the features of both
parents; the second case, by contrast, concerns racial features, which do
necessarily inherit.
Kant situates ‘race’ conceptually between ‘species’ and ‘variety’. Physical
properties that inherit necessarily, but are not characteristics of the species
as a whole, define diﬀerent races, according to Kant. In ‘Determination of
the Concept of a Human Race’, he claims that only skin colour constitutes
such a physical property. A ‘race’, then, denotes a subset of the species that
is characterized by a set of necessarily heritable characteristics which are
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which he would respond to criticisms of his  piece. He specifically mentioned Eberhard
August Wilhelm Zimmermann’s critique (Kant to Johann Jacob Engel,  July , Ak
: ). Zimmermann’s disagreements with Kant did not so much touch on the concept of
race as such, but rather seem to have been limited to explanations and interpretations of
specific purportedly racial properties, e.g., as to whether Native American men were naturally
beardless or pulled their beards out, and as to whether the short stature of certain Nordic
peoples was caused by the arctic cold or by other external influences. Cf. E.A.W. Zimmer-
mann, Geographische Geschichte des Menschen, und der allgemein verbreiteten vierfüßigen Thiere, nebst einer
hieher gehörigen zoologischen Weltcharte,  vols (Leipzig: Weygandsche Buchhandlung, –),
Vol. , pp. –.
not characteristics of the species as a whole (: , ), and which hence
indicate common ancestry.
Another diﬃculty which Kant seeks to resolve with his race theory is that
if one assumes, as many European theorists did at the time, that climate and
local conditions determine race, it is impossible to explain why we do not
always find the same race in diﬀerent regions with the same climate. For
example, one would expect to find similar races in the tropical rainforests in
Africa and South America, yet this expectation is not met.
Kant claims to be able to explain this phenomenon, borrowing an idea
from Buﬀon,14 by stipulating that there once was an original ‘stem species’
[Stammgattung] in one region of the world. This stem species possessed the
predispositions for all the diﬀerent racial features; when humans sub-
sequently started to inhabit other regions of the earth, these predispositions
developed diﬀerently in accordance with the requirements of the climates
and conditions in these diﬀerent regions. Once this developmental process
was complete, however, it could not be undone, and this is why inhabitants
of one region, and even their oﬀspring, do not change colour after they
move to another region.15 There can be diﬀerent races in regions with
similar climates, then, if one or more of these regions has been populated by
a race that had already developed (part of ) its predispositions elsewhere.
Kant himself saw his race theory as significant. Already in  he
described, in a letter to Johann Jacob Engel, an essay on race he was pre-
paring, claiming that because of his novel perspective on the matter, the
essay had ‘gained some importance’.16
The letter to Engel also indicates that Kant believed that the ‘physical’
description could be separated from a ‘moral characterization’ of the races:
‘Moreover, the attached principles of a moral characterization [moralische
Charakteristik] of the diﬀerent human races will serve to satisfy the taste of
those who do not particularly pay attention to the physical aspects’ (p. ).
Apparently Kant regarded the issue of the ‘moral characterization’ of the
races as something of an add-on, included to satisfy the taste of a broader
audience, but not part of the physical theory of race itself, and hence as
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14 G.-L. Leclerc, Comte de Buﬀon, Histoire naturelle, générale et particulière,  vols (Paris,
Imprimerie Royale: –).
15 Earlier, Kant hypothesized that the Stammgattung was coloured a kind of brownish white
(‘Weisse von brünetter Farbe’, DHR : ). In , however, he claims that it is impossible
to guess the colour and anatomy of the first humans, and that whites too have developed from
the original stem species (DCHR : ).
16 Letter to Johann Jacob Engel, the editor of the Philosoph für die Welt, to whom he promised
the piece on race,  July  (: –, at p. ). Kant states that he is too busy to finish the
essay right away, but that he will send it to Engel when it is done. Kant did not return to the
topic directly after finishing the Critique of Pure Reason, however, and he finally sent the essay to
the Berlinische Monatsschrift.
something that might or might not be ‘attached’. In the final version of the
essay, published in  in the Berlinische Monatsschrift, he chose to leave it
out. Because Kant believed that one could separate the physical race theory
from the moral characterization, however, we should not infer from the
fact that he did not include a moral characterization of the races in the essay
that he did not subscribe to one at the time. And indeed, as shown above at
the beginning of this article, his racial hierarchy resurfaces a few years later
in ‘On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy’ ().
Whether Kant’s ‘determination’ of the concept of race satisfied people
such as Herder is highly doubtful. Kant did not solve the problem of de-
marcation, because his emphasis on skin colour would still raise the question
of where to draw the lines between races.17 His assumption of necessarily
heritable characteristics did not convince everyone either, as can be seen
from the scathing criticisms of Kant’s race theory in a  paper by Johann
Daniel Metzger (–). Metzger, a professor of medicine at the Uni-
versity of Königsberg, argues that Kant’s theory runs counter to the most
basic principles of modern physiology. At any stage in human history, he
writes, accidental causes can produce changes that are subsequently herit-
able, and no feature is ineradicably heritable.18
The most visible criticism of Kant’s  race essay, however, both
because it was published in the Teutsche Merkur and because Kant published
an extensive reply to it, came from Georg Forster (–). Forster, who
had spent three years travelling around the world with Captain Cook
and had had extensive personal contacts with non-Europeans, found that
Kant did injustice to the facts, trying to make them fit his theory, a theory
which Forster also regarded as itself fundamentally mistaken. In his 
critical essay ‘Something More on the Human Races’, Forster foregrounds
his methodological disagreements with Kant. He claims that Kant is too
preoccupied with his teleological model, and fails to take account of messy
facts and empirical uncertainties. Also, Forster objects, if Kant’s teleological
framework assumes that Nature is designed wisely, why does he rule out the
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possibility that Nature might enable later migrants to adjust to their new en-
vironments? In addition to voicing these and other disagreements, Forster
criticizes white supremacist theories and the practices of non-white slavery.19
Two years later, Kant replies to Forster’s criticisms in the essay ‘On the
Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy’ (). Without addressing
the many empirical diﬃculties Forster had pointed out, Kant provides a
clarification of the philosophical underpinnings of his teleological model. On
the basis of this clarification, he replies to Forster’s claim that the inability of
races to adjust to diﬀerent climates is counter-purposive. He insists that this
arrangement is purposive. In a passage previously cited above, he writes
(TPP : ; my italics) that Nature especially discourages people from warm
climates from moving to colder ones:
By the arranged adaptation to one’s climate Nature has prevented the exchange thereof, especially the
exchange of a warm climate for a cold one. For precisely this bad adaptation of the new
region to what had already become the natural temperament of the inhabitants of the
old region automatically keeps the latter from doing so [viz migrating].
Of course, it is circular to explain the purposiveness of Nature’s hindering
trans-climatic migration in terms of Nature’s making people ill adapted for
this kind of mobility. Kant adds (TPP : ) a further stipulation which is
supposed to explain why it is purposive for some people to be ill adapted for
trans-climate migration, namely, the stipulation that the non-white races are
not just physically but mentally unfit for this kind of migration:
And where have the Indians or Negroes tried to spread in Northern regions? – Those
who were driven away in that direction have never, in their oﬀspring (such as the
creole Negroes or the Indians called Gypsies), yielded a type that was fit to be seden-
tary farmers or manual workers.*
Kant here re-attaches his ‘moral characterization’ of the races to his
physical race theory. His claim that the diﬀerent races do not change, once
they have diﬀerentiated out from the Stammgattung,20 is given a teleological
interpretation, viz in terms of purposive design; and he connects this claim
with the assumption that some races are not just diﬀerent, but inferior. In-
cidentally, the argument remains circular. What is important in the present
context, however, is that Kant’s comment about the ‘Indians’ (‘Gypsies’) and
‘Negroes’ makes clear that his assumption that the non-white races have
inferior mental capacities (including capacities for agency) plays a crucial role.
It is no coincidence, then, that the footnote connected with this passage (at
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the point indicated by the asterisk in the quotation above) contains Kant’s
endorsement of an anti-abolitionist text.
Finally, the practical consequences which Kant draws from the supposed
racial diﬀerences show that the racial hierarchy cuts deeper than a ‘mere’
diﬀerence in temperament (such as the diﬀerences in temperament attrib-
uted to the French and the Germans, A : –). His endorsement of a
pro-slavery text,21 for example, goes far beyond what could ever be war-
ranted by any ‘natural temperament’ on the part of the enslaved, as slaves
are reduced to property and used as mere means.
III. INCONSISTENT UNIVERSALISM OR
CONSISTENT INEGALITARIANISM?
The account so far raises the important question of how to deal with Kant’s
racism. Given Kant’s hierarchical view of the races, what is the appropriate
attitude of a commentator or Kantian theorist today? In the current Kant
literature, one can distinguish two basic reactions. The most common view
is that Kant’s racism is a regrettable and appalling fact, but that it lies at the
periphery of his philosophy, and that one can quite easily isolate it from
the more important core of his Critical philosophy. Kant’s moral univers-
alism contradicts his particular views on race, it is argued, but one can and
should focus on the former. Thus Robert Louden writes
Kant’s writings do exhibit many private prejudices and contradictory tendencies. It
may well be that the Kant who wrote that ‘the Negro can be disciplined and
cultivated but never genuinely civilized’ (Refl. , : ), and who ‘hardly believes
the fair sex is capable of principles’ (Beob. : ), would not accept these logical
implications of his own theory [namely, that he is contradicting himself]. But Kant’s
theory is fortunately stronger than his prejudices, and it is the theory on which
philosophers should focus.22
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Kant’s repeated assertion that ‘the whole human race’ has a moral destiny implies that Kant
believed that women and non-white men, too, will eventually participate in the process
towards moralization. Given Kant’s usage of the phrase, however, this implication should not
be drawn. According to Kant, humankind can make progress even if many humans cannot.
He did not shy away from suggesting that some races may not contribute to or benefit from
historical progress. When asking whether the history of humankind is progressive, he explains,
he is looking at ‘the human species as a whole (not, say, whether humans of a specific race,
e.g., whites – and excluding Negroes or Americans – share in this advantage); therefore [the
question is] not whether all human beings, but whether the whole of them makes progress,
even if some of them lag behind’ (undated, Refl. Anthr. : ). Thus when Kant asserts that
there are reasons to believe that humankind makes progress, this does not imply that he
assumes that whites and non-whites will equally contribute to and share in this process.
Hill and Boxill argue, on the basis of the claim that Kant’s racism does not
follow from his basic moral and political principles, that his moral and
political theories are not infected with racism. What needs to be changed,
in their view, is ‘certain false empirical beliefs and inessential derivative
theses’ defended by Kant.23
This dominant reaction has been sharply criticized of late. Charles Mills
has argued that Kant’s moral and legal theory is not universalist at all. He
claims that Kant intends to apply the Categorical Imperative and the Prin-
ciple of Right to whites only: when Kant speaks of ‘everyone’, he means in
reality ‘all whites’, not ‘all humans’. Therefore, Mills argues, there is no
contradiction between Kant’s oﬃcial universalist theory and his views on
race: his so-called universalism is in reality no more than white egalit-
arianism. ‘Racist ideas are central to his thought’, Mills writes, and Kant
‘makes whiteness a prerequisite for full personhood’.24 Thus (p. ), ‘far
from being in contradiction to modernist universalism and egalitarianism,
then, racism is simply part of it – since the egalitarian theory’s terms were
never meant to be extended generally outside the European population’.
Or, putting it diﬀerently (p. ), ‘when Kant urged on us the overwhelming
importance of respecting persons, he was really talking (on this planet) about
whites (more precisely, a subset of whites)’ [viz males]. When Kant states, for
instance, that we ought not to treat the humanity in our own person and
that of others as a mere means, he simply does not include non-whites in the
group of persons. They are merely sub-persons, in Mills’ terminology, to whom
the core Kantian principles are not supposed to apply. If one follows Mills’
interpretation, Kant is better read as a consistent inegalitarian than as an
inconsistent universalist.
Mills’ interpretation erroneously projects our current notion of person-
hood onto Kant’s texts, however. When one looks at the way in which Kant
himself defines personhood (‘personality’), it becomes clear that he attributes
it to all humans, as beings endowed with reason.25 Kant introduces the idea
of beings that are ends in themselves by stating ‘rational beings ... are
designated “persons” because their nature indicates that they are ends in
themselves.... Now I say, a human being, and in general every rational
being, exists as an end in itself and not merely as a means to be arbitrarily
used by this or that will’ (G : ). This is not because of membership in the
human species as a biological group, but because of the nature of humans as
rational beings. From what Kant says in the Groundwork, then, it is clear
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25 This argument could most easily be made on the basis of Kant’s discussion of
‘personality’ in the Religion (: –), but because I am here discussing his s views, I shall
develop the argument by referring to the Groundwork only.
that we find personality wherever we find humanity (because we find it
wherever we find rationality). Correspondingly, the restriction on the use of
others is formulated in terms of their being rational beings or human beings,
where human beings are taken to be one kind of rational beings, i.e., be-
ings endowed with reason.26
Thus in order to defend convincingly his thesis that Kant’s stated moral
principles consistently exclude non-whites (as being sub-persons), Mills
needs to show that on Kant’s view, non-whites are not even human beings.
But Mills himself denies that Kant saw non-whites as non-humans, and
indeed, Kant is perfectly clear about the fact that he regards all ‘races’ as
humans, as illustrated by the essay ‘Determination of the Concept of a
Human Race’ discussed above.
What this shows is that Kant was an inconsistent universalist. There is a
genuine contradiction between, on the one hand, Kant’s stated universalist
moral principles, which are formulated as applying equally to all humans
(and even to all rational beings), and, on the other hand, his specific views
on racial hierarchy and the various alleged deficiencies on the part of non-
whites.
Importantly, however, this does not have the implication rejected by
Mills and championed by others, namely, that Kant’s racist claims can be
demoted to regrettable but philosophically unimportant atavisms or idio-
syncrasies which contemporary interpreters can safely ignore when they
‘focus on Kant’s theory’. Even if Kant’s racism does not infect the formu-
lation of his universalist principles, this does not mean that it is therefore
easily put aside.
Both sides in the discussion seem to focus merely on the question of
whether or not Kant’s racism is connected with his core ethical and political
principles. Authors who believe that it is not argue that we can isolate it
from these principles and continue our business as usual. Mills believes that
it is, on the basis of Kant’s racist remarks, and argues that Kant’s principles
should be rephrased in inegalitarian terms. Even if the most fundamental
principles of Kant’s practical philosophy (such as the Categorical Impera-
tive) are free from racism, however, this does not by itself imply that his
racism is merely a matter of ‘inessential derivative theses’.
What is overlooked by both sides is the possibility that Kant’s principles
are race-neutral in their formulation, but that his racism still makes its
influence felt in his theory by aﬀecting the articulation of intermediate
principles and the selection of central problems to be addressed. Before we
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can be certain, therefore, that Kant’s racism can be isolated from the rest of
his theory, we should investigate carefully exactly what role it plays in his
wider moral and political theory. Only by actually investigating its system-
atic role in the larger whole of his practical philosophy can we assess the
importance of Kant’s racism (or lack thereof ) , and determine what (if
anything) is needed to eradicate it entirely.
A strong indication that Kant’s racism really does play a role in his s
political theory is that Kant himself makes significant structural changes to
the relevant parts of his political theory during the s, when he gives up
his hierarchical view of the races. As I shall show in more detail in the next
section, he then introduces a new, third, category of public right, namely,
‘cosmopolitan right’, and a new theme in his discussion of cosmopolitanism,
namely, the injustice perpetrated by colonial powers. These changes are not
necessarily revisions of the principles of Kant’s practical philosophy (although
the introduction of the notion of cosmopolitan right as one of the three parts
of public right could probably qualify as such), but they certainly go beyond
mere adjustments at the level of ‘inessential derivative theses’, and can count
as changes to the theory.
In the works of the s Kant advocates a ‘cosmopolitan condition’ (cf.
IUH : ). What he means by this is a legal regulation of the relationships
between states in the form of an international federation. In the mid-s,
he introduces a (novel) distinction between ‘international right’ and ‘cosmo-
politan right’. The first pertains to states and regulates their interaction; the
second pertains to individuals as ‘citizens of the world’, i.e., independently of
national aﬃliation, and regulates the interaction between states and foreign
individuals. Cosmopolitan right applies to humans on all continents, and
is explicitly incompatible with slavery and colonialism. Clearly, this view
would not occur to someone who views whites as superior and non-whites
as so radically inferior that the first may use the second as mere means (as
slaves). The same holds for Kant’s critique of colonialist injustice, which also
appears for the first time in the mid-s.
These examples are indicative of the fact that in order to eradicate racism
from a theory, often more is needed than merely deleting explicitly racist
statements, because the aim will often require introducing additional posi-
tive changes as well.27 Even if racism is not seen in the core principles (such
as the Categorical Imperative), it may have influenced the intermediate
principles which together make up ‘the theory’, or it may express itself in
omissions such as Kant’s failure during the s to criticize non-white
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slavery. Moreover, if present-day Kantian theorists take over the structure of
Kant’s s moral or political theory and the set of issues he deemed salient
(together with the concomitant blind spots), without realizing that their
articulation has been influenced by racist assumptions, they are likely to
prolong racism’s distorting eﬀects.
In short, racist prejudice can (and in Kant’s case does) influence how the
most basic moral and political principles are applied in the elaboration of
the full theory. This is illustrated as much by Kant’s failure to criticize race-
related injustice during the s as by his theoretical innovations in the
mid-s, when, as I shall now show, he changed his views on race.
IV. KANT’S SECOND THOUGHTS
Kant radically revised his views on race during the s. He gives no
indication of when or why he changed his views. He makes no mention of a
racial hierarchy anywhere in his published writings of the s, however,
and what he does say about related issues contradicts his earlier views on a
racial hierarchy and a plan of Nature designed to restrict human migration
(after their initial dispersal across the globe). I first discuss evidence for the
thesis that Kant dropped his hierarchical view of the races, and then turn to
the status of the concept of race as such in his later work.
In Toward Perpetual Peace and the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant clearly departs
from his earlier position in a number of ways. First of all, he becomes more
egalitarian with regard to race.28 He now grants a full juridical status to
non-whites, a status irreconcilable with his earlier defence of slavery. For
example, his concept of cosmopolitan right, as introduced in Toward Perpetual
Peace (: ), explicitly prohibits the colonial conquest of foreign lands:
If one compares with this [viz the idea of cosmopolitan right] the inhospitable behaviour
of the civilized states in our part of the world, especially the commercial ones, the
injustice that the latter show when visiting foreign lands and peoples (which to them is
one and the same as conquering those lands and peoples) takes on terrifying propor-
tions. America, the negro countries, the Spice Islands, the Cape, etc., were at the time
of their discovery lands that they regarded as belonging to no one, for the native
inhabitants counted as nothing to them.
Any European settlement requires contractual agreement with the existing
population, says Kant, unless the settlement takes place so far from other
people that there is no encroachment on anyone’s use of land. In the section
on cosmopolitan right in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant specifically stipulates
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that such a contract should not take advantage of the ignorance of the in-
habitants with regard to the terms of the contract (MM : ), a stipulation
which presupposes a concern not found in the s texts.
The very fact that Kant regards Native Americans, Africans and Asians
as (equally) capable of signing contracts, and as persons whose interests
and claims present a normative constraint on the behaviour of European
powers, indicates a shift in perspective. After all, as long as Kant regarded
slavery as appropriate for Native Americans and Africans, he did not con-
sider their consent to be important at all. The same can be said about the
fact that he now defends hunting and shepherding peoples against en-
croachment by Europeans, instead of highlighting their failure to develop
agriculture as he did earlier. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant rejects con-
sequentialist justifications for colonialism (the alleged ‘civilizing’ eﬀects on
the ‘savages’) (MM : ). He also rejects the argument that the European
colonists are justified in claiming ownership over foreign lands and their
inhabitants by the fact they ‘establish a new civil union with them and bring
these human beings (savages) into a rightful condition’. Instead, Kant main-
tains that the latter have the right of first possession, and that this right is
violated by the European ownership claims (MM : ).
Importantly, Kant has now become unambiguously opposed to chattel
slavery. Robert Bernasconi has claimed that Kant was ‘silent on the slave
trade in Africans’ and ‘failed to speak out against chattel slavery’, and that
he is ‘aware of no direct statement by Kant calling for the abolition of either
African slavery or the slave trade, even if only in principle’.29 Such state-
ments do exist, however. In his notes for Toward Perpetual Peace (–),
Kant repeatedly and explicitly criticizes slavery of non-Europeans in the
strongest terms, as a grave violation of cosmopolitan right (: –). He
formulates a scathing critique of the conduct of European powers elsewhere
in the world. He sharply criticizes ‘the civilized countries bordering the
seas’, whom he accuses of recognizing no normative constraints in their
behaviour towards people on other continents and of regarding the ‘possess-
ions and even the person of the stranger as a loot given to them by Nature’.
Kant censures the slave trade (‘trade in Negroes’), not as an excessive form
of an otherwise acceptable institution, but as in itself a ‘violation’ of the
cosmopolitan right of blacks (: ). Similarly, he criticizes the fact that
the inhabitants of America were treated as objects belonging to no one, and
‘were displaced or enslaved’ soon after Europeans reached the continent
(: –). After having discussed European behaviour in Africa, America
and Asia, he concludes (: ):
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The principles underlying the supposed lawfulness of appropriating newly discovered
and purportedly barbaric or irreligious lands, as goods belonging to no one, without
the consent of the inhabitants and even subjugating them as well, are absolutely
contrary to cosmopolitan right.
In the published version of Toward Perpetual Peace, Kant repeats this judge-
ment. He criticizes the ‘very most gruesome and most calculated slavery’30
on the Sugar Islands (PP : ). In the Metaphysics of Morals too (MM : ,
, ), he categorically and repeatedly condemns chattel slavery.31
These passages show that Kant changed his earlier views on the status of
non-whites. The oft-defended thesis that Kant’s racism remained constant
thus needs correction, and one should not use evidence from the s in
support of claims about his views in the s. For example, his statements
from the mid-s contradict the view that the role of the ‘idle races’ in
Kant’s cosmopolitan theory was merely that of a contrast against which
Europeans could measure their own progress,32 as well as the view that for
Kant, the non-white races counted as a ‘waste’ of nature.33 These inter-
pretations are based on Kant’s earlier texts, and therefore they are at most
defensible as interpretations of his earlier views, not of his later views on the
races.
Kant not only became more egalitarian with regard to race, he also
revised his view of the role of race in connection with intercontinental
migration. In some of his earlier writings he called racial diﬀerentiation
‘necessary’ for the preservation of the species during its initial dispersal
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tion cannot be reconciled with Kant’s discussion of cosmopolitan right, however.
32 S. Shell, ‘Kant’s Concept of a Human Race’, in S. Eigen and M. Larrimore (eds), The
German Invention of Race (SUNY Press, ), pp. –, at p. .
33 Larrimore, ‘Sublime Waste’.
across the globe (DCHR : ), and claimed that Nature discouraged sub-
sequent migrations. As Mark Larrimore has shown, however, these claims
were in tension with Kant’s repeated declarations, often in the same
writings, that whites are able to live anywhere on earth,34 for they imply that
racial diﬀerentiation (or, more precisely, the development of non-whites) is
not really necessary for the preservation of the species after all. Kant’s later
position simply does not attribute any special role to racial diﬀerentiation
(let alone racial hierarchy) for the purpose of global migration.
In his  description of what Nature has done to enable humans to live
everywhere on earth, Kant omits any mention of predispositions for diﬀer-
ent races (PP : –). He now claims that Nature has organized the earth
in such a way that humans can and will live everywhere, and that they will
eventually use the surface of the earth for interacting peacefully (PP : ).
The new category of cosmopolitan right, introduced in Toward Perpetual
Peace, is premised on increasing and continuing movement and interaction
across borders. He concludes his exposition of cosmopolitan right (which
includes his critique of colonialism and slavery) with the hope that
In this way, remote parts of the world can establish relations peacefully with one
another, relations which ultimately become regulated by public laws and can thus
finally bring the human species ever closer to a cosmopolitan constitution (PP : ).
Instead of his earlier claim that blacks and Native Americans cannot govern
themselves (: ) and that Europe ‘will probably eventually legislate for
all other continents’ (IUH : ), Kant now envisages a world in which
people of diﬀerent colours and on diﬀerent continents establish peaceful
relations with each other that honour the normative principles laid down in
his exposition of cosmopolitan right.
Finally, Kant’s ascription of mental characteristics to the diﬀerent races
has changed. For example, he ascribes the ideal of military courage equally
to Native Americans and mediaeval European knights (PP : ). This
stands in marked contrast with his earlier insistence on the weakness and
inertia of Native Americans.
As Kant dropped his hierarchical view of the diﬀerent races, the role of
the concept of race as such became less prominent. During the s the
topic of race disappears almost entirely from his published writings. The
only exceptions are found in the Anthropology, and they are quite telling.
The role of race in the published version of Kant’s Anthropology lectures
is radically diﬀerent from that in earlier lectures on the subject. Whereas,
under the heading ‘The Character of Race’, he had previously expounded
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(eds), The German Invention of Race, pp. –, at p. .
his account of race and racial hierarchy, in the published version of the
Anthropology there is no discussion at all of the supposedly diﬀerent ‘charac-
ters’ of the races. The section on race now contains a brief reference to a
book by Christoph Girtanner, who oﬀers an extensive discussion of race on
the basis of Kant’s conception of it.35 Interestingly, Girtanner focuses purely
on issues of anatomy and physiology and does not provide any ‘moral char-
acterization’ or racial hierarchy of intellectual talents and psychological
strengths.36 As Robert Louden has rightly remarked, it is strange that the
section on race in its final form appears in the Anthropology at all, because its
current contents have no bearing on the work’s stated aim.37 In fact, in the
preface to the work Kant explains that race does not belong in the Anthropo-
logy, because it is merely a matter of physiology without ‘pragmatic’
relevance, that is, without direct bearing on the use of one’s freedom as a
human agent.38 This statement provides further support for the thesis that
Kant had given up his description of the diﬀerent races as having very
diﬀerent ‘characters’ and even diﬀerent moral standing. This statement,
together with the endorsement of Girtanner, also indicates that Kant did not
renounce the concept of race as such, but restricted it to physiology, while
dropping the racial hierarchy which he had previously associated with it.
In the race section in the Anthropology, Kant writes only one paragraph,
and it is meant to comment on varieties within one race, not on race itself.
This comment is interesting enough, however, as he introduces the topic of
‘variety’ here by speaking of ‘Nature’s aim’ in the ‘fusion of diﬀerent races’,
namely, ‘assimilation’:
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36 The only exception is the remark (p. ) that ‘the slow Negro’ and ‘the even slower
American’, when reproducing together, produce ‘extremely active and courageous’ oﬀspring.
Also, such characterizations can be found in a few of Girtanner’s Kant quotations. But
Girtanner does not use these parts of the quotations for any point of his own. Moreover, he
remarks that civilized Europeans who emigrate to North America ‘become completely
savage’. ‘They become just as lazy and inactive as the native savages.... In a word, they do not
merely entirely adopt the character and morals of savages, but they also become somewhat
similar to them with regard to colour and facial traits’ (pp. –), a remark which seems to
indicate that he connects slowness with being ‘savage’, not with race per se. Tellingly, Kant’s
comment about Nature hindering South–North migration more than vice versa is changed, in
Girtanner’s paraphrase, to an identical hindrance in both directions (p. ). In short, Gir-
tanner’s Kantianism does not imply his endorsement of Kant’s earlier race-related hierarchy
of natural incentives and talents; so neither does Kant’s endorsement of Girtanner.
37 Louden, Kant’s Impure Ethics, p. .
38 Kant states that ‘even knowledge of the human races as resulting from the play of nature
does not yet count as pragmatic but merely as theoretical knowledge of the world’ (A : ).
Larrimore (‘Race, Freedom and the Fall’, p. ) reads this as Kant’s ‘promise’ to deliver a
pragmatic anthropological account of race. Kant seems to mean the opposite, however (see
also his usage of ‘not yet’ in the previous sentence, : ), which is consistent with the fact that
he does not provide such an account in the pertinent section in the book. Cf. also A : .
Instead of assimilation, which Nature aimed at in the fusion of diﬀerent races, here
[viz in producing varieties] Nature has made exactly the opposite into a law for itself:
namely, in a people of one race (e.g., the white race), instead of letting the char-
acteristics, in their formation, constantly and progressively approach one another
... [this law involves] multiplying endlessly the bodily and mental characteristics in the
same tribe and even in the same family (A : ).
Kant’s claims about hybridization as such are not new, of course. What is
new is that now ‘fusion’ of races is seen as at least part of Nature’s design, and
that it is called an ‘aim of Nature’ at all. This is quite far removed from
Kant’s earlier comment in his lectures on physical geography that ‘the end
of Nature would be lost if half-breeds became common’ (because, he then
still feared, this would mean that humans would become physically and
psychologically similar) (Dohna Lect. Phys. Geogr., Summer semester ).
What is also new is the remark that racial assimilation does not lead to
universal uniformity, because it goes hand in hand with the emergence of an
infinite number of varieties. Kant does not take the additional step of claim-
ing that Nature aims at overcoming race in this way. Still, the only possible
conclusion is that he had radically recast the role of race within his teleo-
logical view of Nature.
As previously noted, the Dohna Lectures on Physical Geography from
 still contain elements of Kant’s hierarchical account of the races. Thus
Kant’s second thoughts must have occurred after those lectures and before
the completion of the manuscript of Toward Perpetual Peace (). That his
conception of the role of race was still unstable at the time of writing Toward
Perpetual Peace can be inferred from the fact that in the preparatory notes he
mentioned racial diﬀerence as one of the forces that keep humans apart (in
addition to diﬀerences in religions and languages), but in the final manu-
script he left it out (cf. :  and : ).39
Kant’s change of mind may have been prompted by his general revision
of his theory of biology.40 His earlier race theory had been intimately con-
nected with a theory of biology which he modified in the Critique of Judgement;
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40 Phillip R. Sloan has argued that Kant dropped the notion of Keime at the very end of the
s, under the influence of the work of Johann Friedrich Blumenbach (–), a leading
biologist at the time. Blumenbach had sent Kant a copy of the  second edition of his
famous book Über den Bildungstrieb und das Zeugungsgeschäft. Kant incorporated important aspects
of Blumenbach’s theory in his Critique of Judgement (), which, according to Sloan, resulted in
Kant’s ‘dramatically weakening’ his appeal to the existence of preformed ‘germs’: Sloan,
‘Preforming the Categories: Eighteenth-Century Generation Theory and the Biological Roots
of Kant’s A Priori ’, Journal of the History of Philosophy,  (), pp. –, at p. . The notion
of preformed germs (Keime) was an important part of Kant’s race theory, and so changes in the
former may well have led to changes in the latter. More research on this issue seems necessary,
however, because the notion of Keime never fully disappears from Kant’s work.
it is possible that he subsequently came to realize that his views on the
innate predispositions for the various races no longer fitted his new theory.
One diﬃculty with this possible explanation, however, is that he did not give
up the concept of race as a biological category, but only the hierarchy of
the races and the associated ‘moral characterization’. He continued to en-
dorse race as a bona fide physiological concept, and he endorsed Girtanner’s
book as an elaboration of his own views on race.
More plausible, therefore, is the assumption that Kant gave up the hier-
archical view of the races in the context of his elaboration of his political
theory and theory of right. The time when he changed his views on race
falls within the period during which his political theory and philosophy of
right underwent significant transformations, in the wake of the French
Revolution. Examples of other important developments in Kant’s political
theory around this time are his notion of citizenship, his republicanism,
and the concept of cosmopolitan right. Kant was never generous in explain-
ing to posterity the genesis or transformation of his views, and thus we may
never know the precise circumstances of his change of mind. Yet it would
certainly not be surprising if he had started to reconsider his earlier acquies-
cence in the European practices of colonialism and slavery while he was
developing his new theoretical commitments, and if he had decided to give
up entirely the hierarchy of the races, even while retaining the notion of
race as a purely physiological concept.
However this may be, Kant texts from the mid-s show that he had
had second thoughts about his earlier hierarchical account of race. During
the s, as he wrote the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason, and
probably until at least , his disturbing views on race contradicted his
own moral universalism. He finally resolved this contradiction during the
mid-s, at the latest during the writing of the manuscript for Toward
Perpetual Peace. This finds expression not only in his explicit strengthening, in
his moral and legal theories, of the status of non-Europeans, but also in his
description of the mental properties which he attributes to non-whites, and
especially in the harsh criticism of the injustice perpetrated by the European
colonial powers.41
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